Abstract. A particular multilevel optimization problem, generated by a concrete economic problem related to technology transfer area, is approached in the present paper. We study the case when two firms compete on the market in a differentiated Stackelberg model and there is no technology transfer between the innovator firm (the leader firm) and the follower firm. A mathematical model is attached to this particular economic problem and an optimal solution is found. The model consists in a multilevel parametric programming problem, in which both the upper and the lower level functions are to be maximized under some given conditions.
Introduction
Licensing is one of the many significant methods used for technology transfer between firms. Licensing can be defined as the granting of permission to use intellectual property rights (such as patents, trademarks or technology) under defined conditions. As known, technology licensing represents a major economic activity and plays an important role for growth of firms and economy. Getting a new technology by technology licensing is a low risk access to increase the corporation profit. Although research and development (R&D) is a good way to stimulate the growth of the firm profit, it needs not only to invest a lot of money, but also to spend a lot of time. Many firms have not enough capital or time to engage themselves in R&D activity, so they choose to adopt a new technology and get a technology licensing [2, 3, 4] . In [3] the authors have considered a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages itself in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The authors have studied the licensing of the costreducing innovation in this paper. In the present paper we study the case when in a differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model there is no technology transfer between the innovator firm and the follower firm (i.e. benchmark or pre-licensing case). A mathematical model is attached to this particular economic problem and an optimal solution is found. The model consists in a multilevel parametric optimization problem [1] , in which both the upper and the lower level functions are to be maximized under some given conditions.
The basic framework
Let us consider a duopoly model where two firms, denoted by F 1 and F 0 , produce n differentiated goods. The inverse demand functions are given by
n represent the outputs of firms F h and F 1−h , respectively, where h = 1; and d represents the degree of the differentiation of goods,
The duopoly market is modeled as a Stackelberg competition: the leader firm F 1 choose its output level and then the follower firm F 0 is free to choose its optimal output taking into account the leader's output; so, the firms do not decide simultaneously the level of their outputs. Initially, both firms have identical unit production cost c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ R n , with c j ∈ (0, 1), ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We consider that firm F 1 , the leader firm, can engage itself in an R&D process in order to improve its technology. This allows a reduction of its production costs by an amount called innovation size. The cost-reducing innovation creates a new technology that reduces innovating firm's unit cost by the amount of k, while the amount invested in R&D is k 2 /2. We consider the case when there is no technology transfer between the innovator firm and the follower firm (i.e. benchmark or no-licensing case).
3 Modeling and solving the concrete economic problem: Benchmark case
Let n ∈ N * be a natural number, J = {1, . . . , n}, and γ = (γ 1 , ..., γ n ) ∈ R n . Let T ⊆ R n be the set of variation of the parameter
n × R n → R be the functions given, respectively, by
i.e.
The elements of the set S * d (z) will be generically denoted by x z . Let us consider the three-level parametric programming problem
For each d ∈ T , by (P d ) we denote the three-level programming problem obtained from (P ; T ) if the parameter is fixed to d.
n , then the problem (P ; T ) is the mathematical model attached to the basic economic problem described above.
Determining the set S
We consider the problem
it results that the function ϕ d,x is strictly concave. Hence, we get that
is the maximum point of ϕ d,x . Therefore, recalling the problem (
We consider the following programming problem
n being the identity matrix in n dimensions. We remark that
For d ∈ T fixed, we denote by
For d ∈ T and z ∈ R n both fixed, we set
Therefore, the function φ d,z is upper unbounded on R n + . (ii) Now, let us suppose that
If we consider the sequence (x k ) k≥1 , with x k = ke h , for each k ∈ N, where e h represents the h-vector of the canonical base, then x k ∈ R n + , for all k ∈ R and we have
Therefore, the function φ d,z is upper unbounded on R n + .
Let d ∈ T and z ∈ R n be such that 
is a maximum point of φ d,z .
Under the hypothesis that m > 0, let J d − = {j 1 , . . . , j m } be such that 1 ≤ j 1 < · · · < j m ≤ n. We consider the functionφ d,z : R m → R given by:
Proposition 4. The functionφ d,z : R m → R is strictly concave and its unique maximum point isx = (x j 1 , ...,x jm ), wherẽ
, for each h ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Proof. It is easy to see that for each h ∈ {1, . . . , m} and ∀ (x j 1 , . . . , x jm ) ∈ R m we have
and
< 0, for all h ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Therefore, the functionφ d,z is strictly concave. Then, it has a unique maximum point given by (x j 1 , . . . ,x jm ). From (3) we get thatx j h =
. From Proposition 4 and Remark 3, we obtain the following result. , where
is a maximum point of the function φ d,z . Based on the fact that for a multilevel optimization problem the objective functions of the lower level must have maximum (respectively, minimum) points, Proposition 2 implies that the set T * of feasibility of parameter d has the following property
In what follows, we consider that (5) holds. Under this hypothesis, for each z ∈ R, the set S * d (z) has exactly one element, i.e. we have
Let us remark that, if we consider x z j as function of z j , then this function is continuous on R.
From (1) and (6), we obtain that
Also, we remark that, if we consider y 
Therefore, now we solve the problem
Let us consider the sequence (z k ) k∈N * , where
Then,
, 
Remark 7. Proposition 6 implies that
Let us consider u j : R → R, the function given by
It is easy to see that
is a maximum point of u j on R and
As d 
Proof. Based on (8) and (10), it results that the function θ d will have the same maximum point as its restriction to the set
For each z ∈ Λ, we have θ d (z) = 1 8 j∈J
On the set Λ, the function θ d is twice differentiable.
, ∀ z ∈ Λ, and
As d 2 j < 1, ∀ j ∈ J, it results that the function θ d is strictly concave on Λ. Then, it has an unique maximum point.
, ∀ j ∈ J, and z * ∈ Λ, it results that z * is the maximum point of θ d on Λ, hence the maximum point of θ d on R n .
Remark 9. From Proposition 8 we get that {d ∈ T | d 2 j < 1, ∀ j ∈ J} ⊆ T * . Then, in view of Remark 7, we get that T * = {d ∈ T | d 2 j < 1, ∀ j ∈ J}.
Conclusions
A three-level optimization problem provides the mathematical model of the economic problem approached in this paper. The originality of this problem is that it depends on the parameters d and γ. For the particular case when n = 1, d ∈]0, 1[ and γ ∈]0, 1[, the optimal solution of the problem coincide with the optimal solution obtained from the economic point of view presented in [3] . More, the result that the absolute value of parameter d cannot exceed 1 has an important economic significance. Since d denotes the degree of differentiation of goods, the result justifies the condition d ∈]0, 1[, which is frequently used in the economic literature.
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